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Introduction 
 
The Covid-19 pandemic is 
already exerting a heavy economic toll 
on all areas of the world. The energy 
producing countries of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) make no 
exception. In Saudi Arabia, the 
economic impact of the pandemic has 
been, so far, significant. Meanwhile, 
2020 is a particularly important year for 
Saudi Arabia’s internal socio-political 
cohesion and its international stance. 
Internationally, the Kingdom will be 
subject to increasing scrutiny ahead of 
the Riyadh-hosted November G20 
summit while, domestically, authorities 
are expected to accelerate the pace of 
economic and social reforms related to 
Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 
programme. Economic turbulences are 
affecting the calculation of decision 
makers when it comes to both 
domestic and foreign policy.  
 
Economy 
 
Saudi Arabia’s economy 
suffered the most immediate hit from 
the Covid-19 pandemic. This is 
underscored by the collapse of the 
price of oil—Riyadh’s main source of 
revenue—triggered by the pandemic. 
Since February, China, Saudi Arabia's 
top export destination, has significantly 
reduced its imports by some 3 million 
barrels a day, 20% of Beijing’s total 
demand. The aviation sector, among 
the most energy-demanding industries 
with most flights grounded, is also 
requesting much less fuel. Overall, oil 
demand, and therefore its price, has 
plummeted.  
This has influenced Saudi 
Arabia's decision to pressure Russia to 
find a common strategy to cut back oil 
production and reduce the current 
oversupply, triggering an oil price war 
lasting from 6 March until 14 April 
2020, which drove the prices to 
unprecedentedly low levels throughout 
March, between $25 and $30 (USD) 
per barrel for Brent crude. Worryingly, 
even the end of the oil price war, with 
Riyadh successfully persuading 
Moscow to fall in line with Saudi 
Arabia’s oil strategy, has left the oil 
market in a fragile and volatile status. 
The oil supply is likely to continue to 
exceed oil demand for as long as the 
pandemic continues and throughout 
the upcoming global recession which 
will soon hit most advanced 
economies. The oil demand is already 
expected to fall by some 23.1 million 
barrels per day compared to last year. 
In addition, it has been historically 
problematic to verify stakeholders’ 
compliance with deals involving such 
significant supply cuts.  
Developments related to the 
implementation of Saudi Arabia’s 
Vision 2030 programme are also 
endangered as a consequence of the 
aforementioned economic downturns. 
Vision 2030 is the programme 
promoted by Crown Prince Mohammad 
bin Salman (MbS), which aims to carry 
the Kingdom to a post-oil economy and 
provide new job opportunities for the 
increasing number of unemployed 
youth. The programme focuses on 
economic diversification and relies on 
Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund 
(PIF), to heavily invest in projects and 
companies unrelated to oil. 
Gulf Insights Nº 27 – May 2020 
3 
 
SuchVision2030-related investments 
are likely to be halted for as long as the 
pandemic continues. Instead, Saudi 
Arabia is diverting resources to finance 
a large stimulus and relief package for 
its economy in an effort to maintain 
current employment levels. 
On a more positive note for the 
Kingdom’s economy, Riyadh’s national 
oil giant, Aramco, is better positioned 
than any of its global competitors to 
survive a long period of low oil prices. 
In addition, Aramco can recover faster 
due to its lower costs of production and 
superior stock capabilities.  As such, 
the future normalization of crude oil 
prices could even put Aramco in the 
position to conveniently purchase 
shares of some of its struggling 
competitors in the energy market.  
 
Social Cohesion 
 
The Covid-19 crisis could 
reinforce already existing or underlying 
societal tensions within Saudi Arabia. 
Riyadh has taken unprecedented 
social distancing measures prohibiting 
movement between its provinces and 
imposing a partial nationwide curfew. 
The Kingdom was also forced to stop 
issuing visas for Muslims wanting to 
visit the holy sites of Mecca and 
Medina and restricted internal 
movement for religious purposes. Such 
decisions increased the frustration of 
the more conservative section of 
society which is already struggling to 
accept MbS-spearheaded social 
liberalization reforms. 
The country-wide restrictions 
are particularly unpopular among the 
Kingdom’s large youthful population. 
Indeed, all Saudis suffered from the 
sudden closure of universities, cafes, 
cinemas and other popular public 
spaces. This could create increasing 
opposition between the country’s youth 
and its older citizens, who are the most 
vulnerable to the disease and support, 
more generally, the lockdown. To 
contextualise, Saudi Arabia’s society is 
currently undergoing significant 
changes. Despite that, the elders are 
the ones traditionally commanding the 
utmost respect, younger generations 
increasingly seek engagement and 
opportunities. Such shift is well-
incarnated by Crown Prince 
Mohammad bin Salman Al-Saud 
(MbS), who is attempting to move 
decision-making towards a younger 
generation and prompting the 
introduction of substantial reforms 
which have been welcomed by Saudi 
Arabia’s youth and opposed by older, 
more conservative generations. 
Another source of social tension 
that is gaining momentum and 
deserves ad-hoc monitoring in the 
months ahead, is certainly the 
increasingly problematic relationship 
between Saudi citizens and the 
country’s expatriate workers. Foreign 
workers, who often perform crucial 
functions in Saudi Arabia’s economy, 
have already been identified as Covid-
19 "spreaders" in the public discourse. 
This narrative could foster the already 
existing stigma of significant sections 
of the Kingdom’s society towards 
expatriate workers. The longer Covid-
19 related disruptions will affect 
everyday life inside Saudi Arabia the 
more citizens’ stigmatic perception of 
expatriate workers could consolidate. 
For some expatriates such stigma is 
already translating into discriminatory 
treatment with reports of low-class 
workers quarantined and isolated in 
specific areas with little or no access to 
health care.  
The Covid-19 crisis retains also 
the potential to revamp sectarian 
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divisions characterising Saudi Arabia’s 
society. In particular, citizens in the oil-
rich Shia-majority Eastern Province (Al-
Qatif), have long complained of 
marginalization and discrimination      
by Riyadh’s Sunni-dominated 
government. Al-Qatif was the first 
province of the Kingdom in which 
Covid-19 related restrictions were 
implemented—the province has been 
in lockdown since 8 March—as it was 
identified as the hotspot of Saudi 
Arabia’s first Covid-19 cases. Despite 
that Riyadh’s government assistance 
to Al-Qatif citizens during the health 
crisis was not influenced by sectarian 
discrimination, it is worth pointing to 
the fact that hundreds of their 
countrymen used social media to blast 
them as traitors. Contagion in Al-Qatif 
was linked to its residents’ frequent 
travels to Iran and Iraq for religious 
purposes. Crucially, Iran has registered 
the earliest and most significant spike 
in Covid-19 cases in the whole region.  
 
International Stance 
 
The Covid-19 crisis is also 
having an impact on Saudi Arabia’s 
foreign affairs during a particularly 
important year for the Kingdom’s 
international reputation. The coming 
months will be leading to the high 
profile November 2020 G20 summit, 
scheduled in Riyadh—a major test for 
MbS and his leadership skills.  
In this context, the Crown Prince 
needs to secure the full support of 
Saudi Arabia’s most important ally, the 
US, to limit the potentially negative 
outcomes of the increased 
international scrutiny that the Kingdom 
will face as the G20 summit nears. 
Despite that MbS and the US 
President, Donald Trump, have so far 
enjoyed an excellent interpersonal 
relationship throughout the latter’s time 
in office and that this has consolidated 
the Trump Administration’s support for 
Riyadh, unprecedentedly low oil prices 
have the potential to strain bilateral 
ties. As a collateral effect, the Riyadh-
Moscow oil price war greatly 
contributed to the collapse of the 
American energy industry. In reaction, 
members of the US Congress lobbied 
the Trump administration, and wrote 
open letters to urge Saudi Arabia’s 
Crown Prince to end the oil price war. 
Even more significantly, Republican 
Senators introduced consecutive bills 
calling for the withdrawal of the US 
military from the Kingdom’s territory, 
aiming to pressure Riyadh in the oil-
related negotiations. 
Another international dossier in 
which Saudi Arabia is under pressure 
is the ongoing conflict in Yemen, in 
which Riyadh has been fighting since 
2015 against Iran-backed Houthi 
rebels. The spread of Covid-19 inside 
Saudi Arabia, certainly contributed to 
the Saudi-led coalition’s decision to 
answer UN truce calls and declare a 
two-weeks unilateral ceasefire. In 
Riyadh’s calculations, a suspension of 
the hostilities would benefit the state 
budget and ease international criticism 
over the Kingdom’s military 
involvement in Yemen. However, the 
Houthis have already announced that 
they intend to continue fighting by 
targeting Yemen government’s assets 
and the forces of the Saudi-led 
coalition. The Iran-backed group 
largely views Saudi Arabia’s Covid-19 
related preoccupations and distraction 
as an opportunity to advance militarily 
on the ground and make potential 
gains count during future negotiations. 
The Southern Transitional Council 
(STC) is another faction in Yemen that 
is currently attempting to take 
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advantage of the Covid-19 related 
chaos. The recent STC’s self-rule 
declaration adds pressure on Yemen’s 
internationally recognised government 
and its main patron, Saudi Arabia, to 
obtain more concessions regarding 
autonomy for the southern provinces, 
in exchange for a continued STC 
commitment in the fight against the 
Houthis.   
 
Conclusion 
 
All considered, the collapse of 
the oil prices triggered by the Covid-19 
pandemic is reducing Saudi Arabia’s 
ability to implement important 
development initiatives. In addition, 
when it comes to Saudi Arabia’s most 
prominent ongoing foreign 
involvement, the conflict in Yemen, 
local militias are attempting to exploit 
the fact that Saudi Arabia is diverting 
its attention and resources to deal with 
the Covid-19 outbreak. Covid-19 
related restrictions are also stressing 
the Kingdom’s internal social cohesion. 
To date, the Covid-19 health and 
economic crisis has not threatened 
Saudi Arabia’s internal stability or the 
country’s foreign policy at their core. 
However, the longer the crisis of the oil 
market continues the more the 
aforementioned issues could turn 
increasingly problematic.    
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